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I.

INTRODUCTION

For half a century, Comment k to § 402A of the Restatement, Second,
of Torts' has caused confusion in prescription drug litigation, seemingly
without end. Bidding farewell to Comment k is both justifiable and
overdue. Although William Prosser drafted the Comment in a strategic
move to protect his epic strict products liability Restatement provision from
existential attack, the Comment constitutes an ill-conceived jumble of ideas
that many American courts in the 1980s and 90s believed justified
insulating pharmaceutical companies from design-based liability. 2 In recent
decades, courts have been interpreting Comment k in different and more
confusing ways. Over the latter part of the same time period, courts have
begun to consider whether to adopt the prescription-drug provisions of the
Restatement, Third, of Torts: Products Liability3 on which the authors
served as Co-Reporters. This Article aims to sort things out and to suggest a
sensible path for the future. Although the analysis concludes that courts
should stop trying to make sense of Comment k, the authors have a few
kind words to say about it as a first, but ultimately failed, attempt to address
a complicated subject. Not surprisingly, the approach recommended in this
Article is identical to the drug-design provision in the Restatement, Third.
In any event, in what is likely to be the authors' final treatment of this
topic, 4 the Article reviews what might be termed "the Comment k era;"

'See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Westlaw
lists 449 cases and 494 law review articles that cite to Comment k. (January 29, 2015).
2
See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 476 (Cal. 1988) (stating that Comment k,
interpreted to mean no design-based liability for prescription drugs, has been adopted in the
overwhelming majority ofjurisdictions that have considered the matter).
3

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

4 The

§6

(AM. LAW INST. 1998).

&

authors have addressed this subject in the past. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr.
Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, Ill YALE L.J. 151 (2001); James A. Henderson,
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assesses the current "darkness before dawn" period; and describes the
"settled and sensible" era that hopefully lies just ahead.
Part I of the Article rehearses the origins of Comment k and how it came
to support manufacturers' nonliability for drug design. The discussion in
Part I offers a modem-day parsing of the comment that, admittedly with the
help of hindsight, reveals it to make somewhat more sense than judges
ended up giving it. Part II considers § 6(c) of the Products Liability
Restatement and offers new insights that occurred to the authors only while
writing this Article. Part III describes where things stand now in the case
law, grouping the decisions into functional categories. And the Conclusion
charts the path that prescription drug design liability should, and the authors
believe will, follow in the future. In this last connection, letting Comment k
die in desuetude will be part of forging a sensible liability regime.
Throughout, the Article's perspective is descriptively analytical, concerned
with craft and practicability rather than with normative philosophy. It
observes that the American products liability system appears to aim
instrumentally to create incentives for the relevant actors to invest in
reasonable care, while being fair to all.' The Article seeks to articulate an
approach that fits comfortably into the general fabric of products liability
law and that can be managed by courts, litigants, markets, and nonjudicial
regulators.
II.

COMMENT K: WHERE IT CAME FROM, WHAT IT MEANS

A. How Comment k Became Partof§ 402A
The story behind Comment k is embedded within the broader story of
the Restatement, Second, of Torts, § 402A. 6 Up until the middle of the last
century, American courts had struggled to replace negligence with strict tort
Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: A
Reporter's Perspective,48 RUTGERS L. REv. 471 (1996).
sThe authors adhere to Professor Weinrib's view that in many contexts it does not make a
practical difference what tort law's ultimate objectives are. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Deterrenceand
Corrective Justice, 50 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 621, 629-30 (2002) (instrumental means are compatible
with noninstrumental ends as long as they are conceptually sequenced so that the former give way
when the two come into conflict). Because no such conflicts arise in the mainly descriptive
analysis that follows, the conclusions are relevant no matter what the ultimate objectives are.
6

See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 10-11 (8th ed. 2012). See

generally Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k andfor Strict
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853 (1983).
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as the common-law basis for commercial sellers' liability for harm caused
by mechanically defective products. Dean William Prosser, Reporter for
the Restatement, Second, of Torts from -1954 to 1965, decided toward the
end of that ambitious project to include a special provision-§ 402Arecognizing strict liability as the operative rule for sellers of defective
products.' Most of the attention in the years preceding the adoption of
§ 402A centered on manufacturing defects-dangerous physical departures
from intended product designs.9 Far less attention focused on the generic
risks presented by the product designs, themselves.o In large part this
reflected the traditional conflation of mechanical flaws with legal defects.
By contrast, imposing liability for generic risks-holding a knife
manufacturer liable whenever a user suffers a knife cut-seemed intuitively
inappropriate." And prescription drugs and medical devices, the focus of
this Article, seemed to many observers to epitomize the type of inherently
and unavoidably dangerous products that should not bring strict liabilityor any liability, for that matter-when manufactured properly and marketed
with disclosure of all known, nonobvious risks. 12 Although virtually
everyone agreed that strict liability is appropriate for manufacturing
defects,13 concerns over whether § 402A might eliminate traditional shelters
from liability for generic product hazards posed a threat to the political
attractiveness of the proposed strict products liability rule.
7

See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS

AND PROCESS 4-19 (7th ed. 2011); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1103 (1960).
8See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
9

See id. at cmt. b. See generally HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 7, at 1-22. But see
Michael D. Green, The UnappreciatedCongruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements on
Design Defects, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 807, 808 (2009) (arguing that § 402A covered not only
manufacturing defects but also product designs that do not meet minimum standards of safety).
'oSee James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1531, 1552-73 (1973); George L. Priest,
Strict ProductsLiability: The OriginalIntent, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2301, 2319-24 (1989).
1 Intuitively, one understands that the intended use of a knife is to cut pliable material,
including raw flesh, human or otherwise. If it were argued that cutting oneself is not an "intended
use," one might reply that slicing potatoes is the relevant activity, and it is clearly intended by the
manufacturer. In any event, working out solutions to the problem of liability for design-related
harms is complex and took much longer than did similar problems in connection with
manufacturing defects. See generally Henderson, supra note 10, at 1552-73.
12See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
13 Indeed, that was the central thrust of the inclusion of § 402A in the Restatement, Second.
See Prosser, supra note 7, at 1099-1103.
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The question of whether prescription drugs' generic hazards, or any
generic product hazards, should be covered by the rule of strict liability
arose early in the American Law Institute deliberations concerning § 402A.
Thus, the published Proceedings of the 38t Annual Meeting of the ALI in
1961 reveal a heated discussion among several ALI members and Dean
Prosser in which some outspoken members sought a blanket exemption of
prescription drugs from the purview of § 402A.1 4 Prosser expressed
sympathy with the notion that presumably beneficial drugs might require
more lenient treatment than products generally, but he resisted expressing
such sympathies in the blackletter.1 5 A motion to exempt prescription drugs
from § 402A was put to a vote, and the motion lost.16 Prosser then
suggested that he would deal with the drug issue in a comment.1 7 A motion
to include a comment specifically excluding drugs from § 402A coverage
was also put to a vote, and it, too, lost. 8 Thus, when Prosser sat down to
draft what became Comment k, he must have felt free to include
prescription drugs in § 402A, but also must have felt obligated to
acknowledge the ways in which liability for prescription drugs deserved
less onerous treatment than did products, generally.
B. What Comment k Says and What It Means
To appreciate how and why Comment k came to play a central role, it
will be necessary to perform a bit of legal archeology. As it eventually
became part of the § 402A Restatement package, Comment k divides
naturally into two separate portions of roughly equal length, without formal
subheadings. The first portion, which is of primary relevance to virtually all
claims based on prescription drug designs, reads as follows:
Comment:
k. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products
which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of

14

See William L. Prosser, Continuationof Discussion of the Restatement of the Law, Second,
Torts, 38 A.L.I. Proc. 76, 90-92 (1961).
Id. at 92-97.
"'Id.at 97.

1 id.
" Id. at

98.
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drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the
Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is
injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a
dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable
high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines,
and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot
legally be sold except to physicians, or under the
prescription of a physician.' 9
The "unavoidably unsafe" heading of Comment k would have led one to
believe that the comment was addressing the broader question of how strict
liability would apply to the generic, designed-in risks that every product
categorically presents.20 This position would have been clear beyond
question if the Comment had begun:
All products carry with them categorical risks of injury that
cannot be eliminated by re-design without destroying the
product's utility. Thus, automobiles designed without
engines would be much safer but would be of little, if any,
utility save perhaps as expensive lawn sculptures.
Therefore, automobiles are not legally defective merely
because they are inherently dangerous to use. As long as
the risks are obvious or adequately warned against and the
designs and marketing of the products are reasonable,
sellers of automobiles are not strictly liable for harms
caused by the categorical hazards these products present.
The same rules apply to prescription drugs and devices ....
In any event, instead of beginning Comment k so that its content
matched its heading, Prosser began by limiting his general rule to instances
in which limits on "the present state of human knowledge" cause some
products to be unavoidably unsafe.2 1 In modem terms this language appears
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
20
See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 7, at 239-65.
21 see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
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to present the issue of whether, in judging the reasonableness of a product
manufacturer's design and marketing, a defendant may argue against
liability on the ground that the relevant risks were scientifically unknowable
at time of sale.22 That is certainly an interesting question,23 but it presents
an altogether different problem from one of how courts should respond to
generic product risks. Not just some products, but all products, are
categorically dangerous. 24 For example, the residual, unavoidable risks of
driving an automobile are, by definition, primarily a function of the
deliberate choice of automobile users to travel at inherently dangerous
speeds rather than a function of limits on human knowledge. 25 In any event,
having established that generic product risks are unavoidable, the general
rule of nonliability that follows in Comment k makes sense, even to modem
sensibilities. At the same time, some measure of seller's responsibility for
generic product risks may be warranted.26 But when Comment k observes
that as a general rule inherent categorical risks do not make products
defective in design, it appears to be on sound footing after having gotten off
to a stumbling start.
As noted earlier, Prosser follows the first portion of his Comment k with
a second portion, whose peculiarity resides in its being included at all:
[The rule generally applicable to prescription drugs] is also
true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to
which, because of lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such
experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the
drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The
seller of such products, again with the qualification that

22See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 7, at 211-13; see also infra note 100 and
accompanying text.
23See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 689 (1985).
24
This does not mean that they are necessarily defectively dangerous. Fluffy cotton balls
are

far less dangerous than high-caliber firearms, and yet neither may be defective in any way. In any
event, it is indisputably true that cotton balls present the generic risk of choking someone who
attempts to swallow them in quantity.
25Another way to express this idea is to observe that the generic risks presented by
automobiles are more a result of deliberate human choice than of unavoidable human error or
shortcomings in human knowledge.
26

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§

2(b) cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be
held strictly liable for unfortunate consequences attending
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the
public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.27
By seeming to eliminate the seller's responsibility for "purity of
ingredients," thereby implying that the seller may not be strictly liable even
for manufacturing defects, Prosser suggests that the seller's nonliability
rests on the capacity of the purchaser of even mechanically-defective
products contractually to agree to assume the relevant risks.2 8 Thus, Prosser
would have been well-advised to omit this second portion of Comment k. It
adds nothing substantively to the first portion's development of the concept
of "defect," and by implication addresses subjects--contractual assumption
of the risk and liability for experimental, not-yet-FDA-approved drugsthat did not then play, and never have played, mainstream roles in products
liability jurisprudence. 2 9 By including this second portion, Prosser
accomplished nothing more than to sharpen the Comment's exclusive (and
thus misleading) focus on prescription drugs and make the Comment more

27

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
Applied to nonprescription products in cases involving personal injury, such a capacity

28

would be highly questionable. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL

HARM § 18 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010). If Prosser intended to limit the "purity of ingredients"
exception to experimental drugs, then contractual assumption of the risk (informed consent) would
be less problematic. If patients were told that an experimental drug may contain a yet
undiscoverable contaminant, they might agree to take part in a clinical test that for many would
constitute their best and last chance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM.
LAW INST. 1965).
29
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1968 § 355(i)(4) requires that testing for
investigational drugs is conditioned on obtaining informed consent from those to whom such
drugs are administered. Given the formalities that attend obtaining informed consent, tort claims
against suppliers of investigational drugs are uncommon. See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products
Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 839, 906 (2009). Noah's article provides
insightful analysis of many aspects of drug litigation and will be referred to throughout this article.
See also How Are ParticipantsProtected?, U.S. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Dec. 2014),
Recently,
the
FDA
https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-studies/learn#HowAreParticpants.
announced that it would simplify the process of allowing investigational drugs for treating patients
with terminal diseases. See Opinion, The Right-to-Try Revolt, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2015, at A10.
One would expect that the process of attaining informed consent from the patients who desire to
be treated by unapproved drugs will be rigorous.
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exotically mysterious. One can only conclude that this portion of Comment
k served mostly political, rather than conceptual, ends.30
C. How, for a Time, Comment k Helped Close and Dead-Bolt the
Door on Design-BasedLiabilityfor PrescriptionDrugs
A brief review of design-based liability for nonprescription products
will help clarify what American courts did in connection with prescription
drugs following adoption of § 402A. While the general rule against liability
for inherent, categorical risks applies to all products, not merely to
prescription drugs," the law recognizes a narrow exception for egregiously
dangerous, low-utility nonprescription products. 32 Thus, the seller of an
exploding-cigar novelty item capable of injuring the victim of a meanspirited joke will be liable even though the risk is categorical to the
product.
And when the plaintiff proves that the manufacturer of
nonprescription products failed to adopt a safer reasonable alternative
design (RAD) that would have reduced or avoided plaintiff's harm without
destroying the relevant category, liability attaches for harm proximately
caused by such failure. 34 Thus, for nonprescription products, design-based
liability was (and remains) a very real option available to injured
plaintiffs.3 ' By contrast, relying on Comment k, American courts have
traditionally limited drug manufacturers' liability for generic, designed-in
hazards to their failures to provide adequate warnings to prescribing health

30

Restatement Reporters have, on occasion, agreed to address an issue in a Comment in order
to bolster political support among the ALI membership for more salient positions in the black
letter. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products
LiabilityRestatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 667, 686-94 (1998).
"See, e.g., Parish v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540, 544-45 (Iowa 2006). See
generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American ProductsLiability
Frontier:The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263, 1276-92 (1991).
32

See N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2(b)

LIAB.
33

§

2A:58C-3b (West 2015); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.

cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§2

illus. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., The "Habush Amendment": Section 2(b), Comment e, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 86 (1998-99). The category in the exploding cigar hypothetical is
exploding cigar; removing that feature destroys the category.
34

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ 2(b)

cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1998);

Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product
Designs: The Triumph ofRisk-Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 1061, 1094-97 (2009).
35
See HENDERSON & TWERSKI, supra note 7, at ch. 4.
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care providers. 36 With regard to this special no-design-liability rule for
drugs, two observations are in order. First, Comment k's language, even
though confusing, supports that approach; 3 7 and second, powerful
considerations of management, centering on the role of competent health
care providers as learned intermediaries and the impossibility of litigating
whether an alternative drug design would have received FDA approval,
support the rule against RAD-based drug design liability. 38 Although one
cannot attribute this no-liability rule entirely to Comment k, the Comment
certainly played a significant role in the rule's legitimization. 3 9 Moreover,

as will be made clear, as courts continue to struggle with the drug-design
issue, Comment k continues to impose conceptual constraints that are
making that task more confusingly difficult.40

D. How the No-Design-LiabilityRule of Comment k Began to Buckle
Under Pressurefrom the Plaintiff'sBar
Obviously, the plaintiffs bar and pro-liability academics never have
been very happy with the no-liability rule that seemed to flow from
Comment k's confusing wording.4 1 Why, they have asked, should a highly
profitable industry enjoy a subsidy in the form of a shelter from the designbased tort liability that all other product industries are required to face? 42 As
such questioning mounted, the issue became whether Comment k could be
reinterpreted to allow for judicial review of prescription drug designs
without seeming to reject an important part of William Prosser's legacy.
Beginning in the 1980s, a growing number of courts responded to the
challenge by requiring drug manufacturers to prove that the drug in
question was unavoidably unsafe as a necessary condition to enjoying the

36

See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Read
literally, Comment k says that prescription drugs, being unavoidably dangerous, are not defective
for that reason. Id.
38
See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 170-72.
3See Brown, 751 P.2d at 477, in which the California high court surveys the alternatives and
concludes that "the appropriate test for determining responsibility is the test stated in Comment
k."
40
See infra Part II.D.
41
See Page, supra note 6, at 871-72.
37

42

Id. at 867.

2015]
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Comment k-based no-liability rule. 43 According to these re-interpretations,
a drug that is unavoidably unsafe should not bring design-based liability;
but unavoidability should be proven, not presumed.44 And because
unavoidability is invariably a function of the unavailability of a reasonable
alternative drug design, this new approach in effect rests on the same RADbased test applicable to nonprescription product designs, but with the
burden of proof shifted to the defendant manufacturer. 4 5 This new
approach, its proponents argue, shows respect, rather than contempt, for
Comment k.46 Of course, this interpretation of Comment k leaves drug
manufacturers with the unenviable task of proving a negative-that no
RAD was available at the time of distribution. And it also presents the
question conceptually of how a safer alternative drug, which constitutes a
different molecule from the one plaintiff alleges to be defective in design,
could be said to be a marginal, rather than categorical, variation of the drug
under attack. 47 These, and other, puzzlements appear unavoidably to
surround adoption of this new interpretation of Comment k.48
Beyond these conceptual difficulties, adoption of a RAD-based test for
drug-design defects presents interesting questions of process. What
justifies, in the context of a claim of defective design, a rebuttable
presumption that the risks presented by a drug are avoidable by means of
safer alternatives when well-trained, expert medical providers are
prescribing the drugs in question after being adequately appraised of the
relevant risks and benefits? Of course, the relevant safer alternative drugs
may not yet have reached the market and thus may not have been available
to medical intermediaries; but in that event how could such safer drugs have

43

See, e.g., Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (leading
decision).
"Id. at 463.
45Under the RAD-based approach, the plaintiff must prove that a safer alternative design was
available at time of sale. See Henderson, supra note 33, at 86; see also supra text accompanying
note 33. Under the more recent reinterpretation of Comment k, in order to show that the risk was
unavoidable, the defendant must prove that no safer alternative was available.
46See Kearl, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 461-62.
47

See infra note 114.

480ne puzzlement is how to handle the "unavoidability" issue procedurally. See Brown v.

Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988); see also Kearl, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463. Moreover,
once the defendant proves unavoidability-i.e., that no RAD exists-should not that be the end of
the controversy over defective design?
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been of any benefit to the plaintiffs? 49 Could not a less-aggressive test for
drug design defect be devised that would identify drugs that should not be
marketed and yet avoid the financially crushing implications of allowing
almost all drug design claims to reach the jury?50 And even if the outcomes
in drug-design litigation would not be dire for the industry, how could
courts manage to litigate the question of whether a superior alternative drug
would have been developed and approved by the FDA in time to benefit the
plaintiff?'
II.

THE ARRIVAL OF

§ 6(C)

OF THE RESTATEMENT, THIRD, OF TORTS:

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A. Where § 6(c) Came From, What It Is, and How It Works
In the early 1990s, as the just-described confusions over Comment kbased burden-shifting approaches to drug-design liability were mounting
steadily, the American Law Institute decided to undertake a Restatement,
Third, of Torts that would, over time, replace Prosser's Restatement,
Second.52 The authors of this Article served as Reporters on the first part of
the larger project, a Restatement of Products Liability.5 3 As finally

approved and published in 1998, the products liability project contains a
separate provision, § 6, covering prescription drugs, with a subsection (c)
covering drug design liability. 54 Section 6(c) provides:
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably
safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great
in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not

49

The answer here might be that the plaintiff would be required to prove that the RAD could
have been developed in time to prevent the plaintiff's harm. But that would be a very difficult
issue to litigate, given that it would involve the plaintiff proving that the RAD would have
received FDA approval. See infra notes 95-126 and accompanying text.
'o This is the issue addressed by § 6(c). See infra Part III.
5
1See infra text accompanying notes 112-17.
52

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. FOREWORD (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. REPORTERS (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

54

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§

6 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of
patients.55

The rule expressed in § 6(c) rests on the premise that, as long as a
prescription drug56 provides a positive benefit-to-risk ratio such that a
reasonable provider would prescribe it for at least one class of patients, it is
not defective in design even if it would be unacceptably risky to prescribe it
for a clear majority of patients in need of the type of therapeutic benefit the
drug provides. Observe that nonprescription products are quite different in
this regard. For example, an automobile may be found defective in design if
it is unacceptably dangerous for many users-ordinary humans prone to
errors in judgment-even if for a special class of users-expert,
experienced drivers-the vehicle is adequately safe without the suggested
safety feature.58 And the opposite is true. If most users can operate a vehicle
with reasonable safety, it need not be made safer in design because a small

minority of users require an additional, costly safeguard.59 In those cases
the plaintiff succeeds only by establishing the availability at time of
distribution of a safer reasonable alternative design, a RAD, that would
have avoided harm to the plaintiff at acceptable cost overall.o
Stated somewhat differently, for all products other than prescription
drugs and devices, courts approach the relevant benefit/risk balancing in
aggregative fashion. 6 1 The fact that a harm-causing product exposes a
majority of inexpert users to unreasonable risks that adoption of a RAD
would have avoided may outweigh the fact that a minority of more expert
users derive a significant benefit from using the product as actually
designed.62 And the same is true when a minority of users who require more
design safety are denied relief because a majority of users do not need
55

Md.
Section 6(c) includes "medical devices." This Article speaks only of "drugs" out of editorial
convenience.
"The reasoning supporting this position is that the "one class of patients" should be allowed
to enjoy the benefits of a drug, and all the other classes of patients, for whom the drug is
inappropriate, will be protected by their medical providers who will not prescribe it for them. In
effect, the medical providers make it possible to allow the "one class of patients" to enjoy the
benefits without harming other would-be consumers of the drug.
56

58

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

"See id.
*'Seeid.
" See id.
62

See id.
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greater protection.63 In effect, the design liability rule for nonprescription
products routinely rejects arguments on behalf of a small minority of users
in order to advance the interests of the large majority. Given that for most
products courts adopt an aggregative-welfare perspective, why does § 6(c)
adopt the opposite, nonaggregative perspective? Why does it preserve the
minority's opportunity to derive benefits from a drug even if a much larger
majority would face unreasonable risks if they were to consume the drug in
question? The answer is that health care providers who prescribe
prescription drugs are in a position to make reasonably sure, at least in
theory, that the right drugs reach the right patients-that especially
dangerous drugs are consumed mostly by patients for whom the benefits of
consumption justify exposure to the heightened risks.64 By contrast, with no
similarly-expert extrajudicial screening apparatus in place to assure that
especially dangerous automobile designs will reach only skillful, careful
owner/drivers who can manage the risks, courts must take over that
function and can do so only on the basis of overall, aggregative
probabilities.65
It follows that the prescription drugs that § 6(c) deems defective in
design are drugs that, on any view of individual rights or social welfare,
should not have been marketed for use by anyone at time of distribution to
the plaintiff because they are unacceptably risky for all foreseeable classes
66
of patients. Why wouldn't market competition combined with FDA
regulatory review combine to prevent, without the need for judicial
intervention, such gratuitously dangerous prescription drugs from being
63

See id.

"See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
65

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ 6 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
§ 2(b) cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

Product distributors sometimes attempt to segregate would-be users by warning that their products
are for use "by experts only," or are "not for children." Courts have grappled with whether to give
effect to such marketing when nonexpert users, or children, suffer injury. See M. Stuart Madden,
Products Liability, Products for Use by Adults, and Injured Children: Back to the Future, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1205, 1220 (1994). Regarding drugs, prescribing physicians are privy to detailed
information regarding the patient and the relevant patient-class. Regarding automobiles, with no
learned intermediaries to sort things out, courts can deal only in aggregate generalities.
66
From the perspective of an individual patient's rights to fair treatment, a drug manufacturer
that distributes a worthless drug because it knows that some physicians will err and prescribe it is
tantamount to an intentional wrongdoer. Cf infra note 86 and accompanying text. From an
efficiency perspective, keeping worthless drugs off the market promotes the social welfare, by
reducing reasonably avoidable injuries. Which normative overview ultimately prevails is of no
material significance to this analysis. See Weinrib, supra note 5, at 629-30.
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distributed? Why, in other words, is design-based tort liability, even within
the relatively narrow parameters of § 6(c), necessary at all? An adequate
response to this question must show how alternative nonjudicial regulative
processes are inadequate to perform the screening task that § 6(c) delegates
to courts. The argument in the preceding paragraph justifies § 6(c)'s
individualized, nonaggregative approach to benefit-risk analysis, which
allows a minority class of patients access to a drug that would be unsuited
for all other patients, on the assumption that courts may delegate to learned
medical intermediaries responsibility for assuring that the right drugs reach
the right patients.6 7 Unless market competition coupled with FDA
regulatory review can be shown to be systemically inadequate, the same
logic would support replacing § 6(c) with judicial delegation to nonjudicial
screening processes.
The reasons why courts cannot defer entirely to the prescription drug
market to prevent inappropriate drugs from being distributed in the first
instance or after superior drugs have become available-the reason why the
market quite often fails in this regard-consists of a combination of
Patent law
excessive patent protection and informational overload.
becomes complicit in encouraging market failure when it extends the period
of patent protection to drugs as those drugs approach the end of their
original protective time periods, and does so in ways that effectively expand
the breadth of patent protection. 69 The major anti-competitive effect of
these patent extensions is to discourage the marketing of the sorts of new
drugs that would tend to run the older, higher-risk, less-efficacious drugs
off the market.70 This consideration would seem to support a tort rule for
prescription drugs similar to the rule generally applicable to nonprescription
products-one under which the plaintiff would advance the superior, but
not yet-approved or marketed, drug as a reasonable alternative design
(RAD) that renders the defendant's drug defective in design regardless of
whether anyone has marketed such a drug.71 However, for reasons
identified in a Comment to § 6(c) and elaborated in a subsequent
67See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
68

§6

(AM. LAW INST. 1998).

See George W. Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical
Devices in a Patent-ConstrainedMarket, 49 UCLA L. REv. 737, 761-63 (2002).
id. But see Noah, supra note 29, at 859-60 (arguing that the creator of a genuinely safer
6See
drug will not be barred by patent law from marketing the safer drug).
70
See Conk, supra note 68, at 763.
n See George W. Conk, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
ProductsLiability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1133 (2000).
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discussion,7 2 only drugs already on the market may be considered in
applying that section's "[unsuited] for any class of patients" standard.
Under that approach, when patent law discourages the marketing of newer,
better drugs, patients are left without any recourse, either from the market
or from tort. It follows that, while patent law may be contributing to market
failures by increasing the number of gratuitously-dangerous, worthless
prescription drugs that enter or remain on the market, § 6(c) does not
purport to correct for such patent-related market failures because it does not
allow liability to be based on the possibility that an unmarketed alternative
drug could have been marketed.74
But even if § 6(c) does not try to correct for market failures caused by
over-protective patent law applications, it does respond to potential market
failures-errors by drug prescribers--caused by the inability of such health
care providers to cope adequately with overwhelming quantities of data
regarding the comparative risks and efficacies of large numbers of more or
less substitutable prescription drugs.7 ' Assuming that companies provide
full and fair warnings to prescribing medical providers, courts may be
correct in relying on learned intermediaries to make routine judgment-calls
regarding which drugs, among the significant majority that are suitable for
consumption by large numbers of patients, should be prescribed for which
patients. But regarding the less frequently-presented question of whether a
drug is so inefficacious and risky compared with available alternatives that
it should not be prescribed for any class for patients, a strong argument can
be made that courts are justified in substituting their independent judgments
for those of prescribing physicians. For one thing, it is reasonable to assume
that doctors generally tend to continue to conform to patterns of drug
prescriptions-even obsolete patterns-to which they have been become
accustomed.76 Drugs that were efficacious when first marketed often are
72

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
also infra text accompanying notes 117-44.
73

§ 6 cmt.

f (AM. LAW INST. 1998); see

See infra notes 117-44.
74See infra notes 117-44.
75
in a study, appearing in the May 23, 2011 issue of the Archive of Internal Medicine, the
researchers found that the average [drug] label contains seventy different side effects with more
commonly prescribed drugs averaging around 100 side effects. See Jon Duke et al., A Quantitative
Analysis ofAdverse Events and "Overwhelming" in Drug Labeling, 171 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE,
no.
10,
May
23,
2011,
at
945-46,
available
at
http://archinte.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=48705 1.
76
This tendency is commonly referred to as the "plan continuation bias," an unconscious
cognitive bias to stick with one's original plan in spite of knowledge of changing conditions. It is
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upstaged by new drugs marketed later, and physicians may be unreasonably
slow in making adjustments." And one may also reasonably assume that
manufacturers are likely to allocate greater resources to promoting
prescription of drugs whose continued medical viability is open to question,
thereby increasing the probability of prescriber errors in judgment.
Assuming that total deferral to the market as a screening mechanism
would be misplaced for the reasons just articulated, it remains to consider
whether courts might delegate screening responsibility regarding
questionably efficacious prescription drugs to the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)-that is, retreat to the traditional "no drug design
liability" rule, thereby leaving it to the FDA to monitor doctor's patterns of
drug prescriptions. Several reasons militate against such total delegation.
The first reason lies in the reality that, while the FDA screens for efficacy
and risk in new drug applicationS 79 and drug manufacturers must continue
to monitor the consumption of their products for potentially dangerous side
effects and promptly report the relevant data to the FDA so that warnings to
physicians may be revised and updated,80 no regulatorily-imposed regime
of review is in place seeking to determine whether more recent arrivals have
rendered an established drug obsolete. Upon reflection, it is clear that no
frequently applied in the context of pilots of aircraft as they approach their destinations. Brent
Owens, Protect Yourself From "Get-There-Itis", GENERAL AVIATION NEWS, May 20, 2013,
http://generalaviationnews.com/2013/05/20/protect-yourself-from-get-there-itis/.
"See id.
78See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 171.

7 9See id. at 164-66.
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Professor Noah notes that the FDA has the authority to withdraw a drug from the market
because a safer substitute is available. See Noah, supra note 29, at 853. He also cites instances
where the FDA has requested that a drug be "voluntarily" withdrawn from the market. However,
the inability of the FDA to move with dispatch in deciding that a drug should be removed from the
market because another drug or modality of treatment is superior is exemplified by the continued
approved use of Parlodel despite evidence that the drug was no longer proper for treating one of
the ills for which it was marketed. The FDA approved Parlodel in 1980 to prevent post-partum
lactation in women who could not or elected not to breast-feed their offspring. After approval, the
FDA received adverse reaction complaints that implicated the drug as a possible cause of strokes.
As these reports came in, the FDA sought to get Sandoz (the manufacturer) to issue warnings
about the relationship of the drug and strokes. Sandoz resisted because the drug was very popular
and the company was fearful that a sharply-worded warning would decrease its profits. In 1989,
the FDA requested that Sandoz withdraw Parlodel from the market for post-partum lactation. Its
reason for doing so was that it was not shown to be more effective than a combination of aspirin
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such FDA-managed, largely post-distribution system of monitoring and
review could hope to succeed-that the only regulatory regime that is
practically feasible in this regard is a tort regime in which firms apply the
legal standards to themselves in the first instance and tort liability follows
subsequently upon a showing at trial that the FDA-approved drug that
harmed the plaintiff has outlived its usefulness for all classes of patients. 82
The second reason why delegation to the FDA will not work is that, in
making decisions with regard to safety and efficacy, the FDA relies almost
exclusively on data developed by private drug manufacturers.83 FDA
decisions are thus vulnerable, to an extent that judicial decisions are not, to
being influenced by understatements and misstatements of the relevant
risks. 84
Returning to a point raised earlier regarding an exception to the general
rule against category liability-that courts will impose liability on generic
product categories that are egregiously dangerous in that their substantial
risks greatly outweigh their meager benefits"-the liability rule in § 6(c)
functionally resembles that exception to the no-category-liability rule.
Prescription drugs that are so lop-sidedly dangerous that no reasonable
health care provider would prescribe them for any class of patients may be
said to be egregiously and gratuitously dangerous in a manner analogous to
and breast support to alleviate the discomfort of the cessation of lactation. Sandoz refused to
acquiesce to the FDA request and Parlodel remained on the market as an anti-lactation drug until
1994. For a full history of the FDA's failure to act with regard to Parlodel see Eve v. Sandoz
Pharm. Corp., No. IP-98-1429-C-Y/S, 2001 U.S Dist. LEXIS 4531, at *26-29 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7,
2001). Parlodel was the subject of numerous lawsuits brought by women who suffered strokes
after taking the drug. See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 269-70 (2005); Aaron D. Twerski & Lior
Sapir, Sufficiency of the Evidence Does Not Meet Daubert Standards: A Critique of the GreenSanders Proposal, 23 WIDENER L.J. 641, 652-59 (2014).

82Hart and Sacks refer to such a scheme as one of "self-applying regulation." See HENRY

M.

HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

APPLICATION OF LAW 120-22 (William K. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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Admittedly, drug design litigation relies on experts to determine whether a drug is
defectively designed, but that testimony takes place in the context of an adversarial proceeding.
Experts for both plaintiff and defendant present their opinions and they are subject to searching
cross-examination. Under traditional approaches, no one asks the experts to predict what the FDA
might do in the future. Rather, experts opine about the safety or efficiency of drugs already on the
market.
85
See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; see also Noah, supra note 29, at 848-49.
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the exploding cigar example mentioned in the earlier discussion of the
exception to the category liability rule. 86 Thus, in the context of prescription
drug designs, in most instances courts leave the relevant risk-benefit
analyses to informed, health-care providers. But when a particular drug
should not even be on the market in a fashion similar to harm-causing
exploding cigars, courts make an exception and condemn such an
egregiously dangerous drug design as defective.
B. Why Would Plaintiffs Choose to PursueDrug Design Claims
Under § 6(c) When Failure-to-Warn Claims, Which are Less
Costly to Prosecute, Remain Available?
The increase in social welfare and the vindication of individual rights
that flow from helping to eliminate gratuitously risky drugs from the market
are obvious. 87 But drug design claims under § 6(c) are costly to present
effectively, given the need for technical data and expert testimony to
establish both defect and causation.88 Why would individual plaintiffs
choose to pursue design claims when failure-to-warn claims are generally
available, and are presumably less costly to prosecute?89 Part of the answer
86

See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Another helpful analogy is to the "rational basis"
standard of judicial review of governmental regulatory classifications, under which such
classifications are presumed to be constitutional unless they are shown to have no rational basis
whatsoever-that they could not possibly serve any legitimate governmental purpose. See, e.g.,
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961).
87

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
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8Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Hendrson, Jr., Fixing Failureto Warn, 90 IND. L.J. 237, 242
(2015).
89
A fairly recent study of the defense costs generated by tort claims against business
corporations in the U.S. from 1988-2004 indicates that the two greatest influences on raising such
costs are high stakes and complexity. Toni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation
Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 330, 330 (2007). Both drug design claims
and failure to warn claims are likely to be high stakes, although drug companies might be
expected to view design claims as existential (designs can't be changed) and warnings claims less
so (marketing can be changed more easily); and the stakes are higher for design claims. See infra
text accompanying notes 94-97. As for complexity, the study identifies four factors that increase
that variable: (1) the claims are nonroutine; (2) the issues are novel; (3) the claim requires
specialized expert witnesses; and (4) the case requires highly skilled trial lawyers. See Hersch
Viscusi, supra, at 334. Taking these factors in turn, drug design claims are less routine than
warnings claims, given the requirement in § 6(c) that the drug be one that is unfit for all classes of
patients. And that unusual issue is much more novel than is the issue of whether adequate
warnings were given. Moreover, although the issue of causation will require experts in both
design and warnings contexts, design claims require scientific expertise to a much greater extent
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lies in the negative impact on failure-to-warn claims of testimony by the
prescribing provider in a subset of cases that he knew of the relevant risks
from outside sources, or would have prescribed the drug in question even if
he had known of the risks. 90 Such testimony severely undermines the
plaintiffs ability to establish a causal link between defendant's failure to
warn and plaintiff s harm, likely to result in a ruling for the defendant as a
matter of law. 91 But the same testimony cannot undercut the plaintiffs
design claim in connection with the issue of proximate causation because, if
defendant's defective drug had not been marketed at all, the medical
provider could not have prescribed it in any event. 92 And even when a
plaintiff pursues a failure-to-warn claim that is likely to survive the
manufacturer's motion for judgment as a matter of law on proximate cause,
adding a design claim when the facts warrant is advisable because the jury
may be likely to allocate more significant percentages of fault to the health
care provider (rather than to the drug company) based on "I knew about the

&

on the defect issue than do warnings claims, which are largely rhetorical in nature. See James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse in ProductsLiability: The Empty Shell of
Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 292, 298-99, 316 (1990) (plaintiffs reach juries
relatively easily with failure-to-warn claims). And finally, drug design cases, for the reasons just
given, require top-notch trial lawyers on both sides. Thus, the suggestion in the text that design
claims are more costly to prosecute than warnings claims seems borne out by the study. Hersch
Viscusi, supra, at 330, 334. To be sure, the study focused on defense costs; but the analysis above
applies equally to plaintiffs' costs.
90
E.g., In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Miller v. Alza Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936 (S.D. Ohio 2010) ("Where treating physician
unequivocally testifies that she would have prescribed the subject drug despite adequate warnings,
judgment as a matter of law is appropriate."); Wright v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 06-CV4183-NKL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32121, at *10 (W.D. Mo. Apr 18, 2008) (failure of drug
manufacturer to provide adequate warning of risks associated with a prescription product is not a
proximate cause of a patient's injury if prescribing physician had independent knowledge of the
risk that the adequate warning should have communicated); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F.
Supp. 2d 1174, 1196-97 (D.N.M. 2008) (citing to extensive authority that if the physician knew of
the risk or would have prescribed the drug in any event, the drug manufacturer's failure to warn of
the risk is not the proximate cause of the patient's injury).
91

E.g., In re Fosamax, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 466-67; Miller, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 936; Wright,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32121, at *10; Rimbert, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 1196-97.
92
See Aaron D. Twerski, The Many Faces ofMisuse: An Inquiry into the Emerging Doctrine
of Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv. 403, 421 (1978) (Proximate cause does not
operate as a defense when the proposed design alternative was to prevent the very harm suffered
by the plaintiff). On rare occasions, however, the conduct of a third party or plaintiff may be so
outrageous that defendant may successfully raise a proximate cause defense. See Morguson v. 3M
Co., 857 So. 2d 796, 801 (Ala. 2003).
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risks" testimony in connection with a failure-to-warn claim than in
connection with a drug design claim. 9 To be sure, until recently such fault
allocations mattered little to plaintiffs because of traditional rules governing
joint and several liability-the manufacturer picked up the tab for the
provider's negligence at any event. 94 However, in the current age of tort
reform, in which defendants are liable only for their individual percentages
of fault, jury allocations of responsibility matter a great deal more.95
Another telling advantage to a plaintiff of bringing a drug design,
compared with only a warnings, claim concerns not so much the likelihood
of recovery as the potential size of the award. The authors lack data with
which to support their position empirically. 96 But common sense suggests
that a design claim based on assertions that a manufacturer has deliberately
continued to market a drug that it must know is so inherently inferior
compared with available alternatives that no well-informed, reasonable
health care provider would prescribe it to anyone is likely, if successful, to
stir the passions of triers of fact and justify a relatively generous award.
Indeed, there are bound to be instances in which mass tort claims seeking
not only compensatory but also punitive damages for defective design are
quite plausible. 97

93Lack of proximate causation terminates the drug company's liability, whereas under
comparative fault the defendant's liability is reduced but not eliminated. The logic here is that
where the provider's conduct is not quite bad enough to terminate a company's liability in a
failure-to-warn claim, the same considerations will lead the jury to find the provider
comparatively more at fault than the company. By contrast, the provider's conduct seems less
consequential in relation to a claim of defective design.
94see HENDERSON, JR. & TWERSKI, supra note 7, at 73-74; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY
95

§ 10 (AM.

LAW INST. 2000).

See HENDERSON, JR. & TWERSKI, supra note 7, at 74-76.
96
See id. at 74-75.
9It would depend, of course, on the legal standard for awarding punitive damages. See id. at
667 ("All of these tests [for punitive damages] require something more than mere negligence ....
Either the conduct must be intentional, or it must exhibit awareness of, and indifference toward,
significant attendant risks . . . .").
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THE H-ALF-CENTURY JUDICIAL STRUGGLE TO DEVELOP AN
APPROPRIATE STANDARD FOR DEFECTIVE DRUG DESIGN

A. The Conceptual Chaos Reflected in the Comment k Decisions
There can be no doubt that the confused language of Comment k has
spawned chaos in the decisional law of drug design liability. Courts have
embraced at least eight different standards for drug design liability.98
Relying on Comment k, they have variously held that manufacturers of
prescription drugs are entitled to escape liability for drug designs
completely; 99 that they are entitled to escape from strict liability claims but
not from claims of negligence; 00 that before a court allows a manufacturer
to escape liability for an unavoidably unsafe drug it must make a threshold
decision as to whether the drug in question confers an exceptionally
important benefit that makes its availability highly desirable;' 0 ' that it is the
plaintiffs burden to prove that the risks of a particular drug outweigh its
benefits;102 that it is a defendant's burden to prove that a drug's benefits
outweigh its risks; 103 that a drug may be deemed defectively designed if its

98

See David S. Torborg, Comment, Design Defect Liability and PrescriptionDrugs: Who's in
Charge?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 633, 655 (1998).
99
See infra note 100.
100
The often repeated statement that Comment k immunized drug manufacturers from strict
liability and not from negligence is predicated on the belief that the two theories yield different
results. See, e.g., Lake-Allen v. Johnson & Johnson, L.P., No. 2:08CV00930DAK, 2009 WL
2252198, at *3 (D. Utah July 27, 2009); Cavender v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 4:02CV0 1830
ERW, 2007 WL 1378431, at *6 (E.D. Mo. May 7, 2007); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297,
309 (Idaho 1987); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984) (strict liability
focuses on defendant's product negligence center on defendant's conduct); Lance v. Wyeth, 85
A.3d 434, 451-52 (Pa. 2014). However, if a drug manufacturer is not liable for unforeseeable
risks, see supra note 91, there is little if any difference between negligence and strict liability.
E.g., Olson v. Prosoco Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994); Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365
N.W.2d 176, 184 (Mich. 1984); see also, DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 556
(2005) ("Under a risk-utility test, whether it be called 'negligence,' 'strict liability,' or simply
'design defectiveness,' a manufacturer is subject to liability for failing to adopt a particular design
feature that would have prevented the plaintiff's harm, if the safety benefits of the design feature
were greater than its costs.").
"o1 See, e.g., Cavender, 2007 WL 1378431, at *5; Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., No. 5:05527-JMH, 2006 WL 3533072, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2006); Feldman, 479 A.2d at 382-83.
102 Miller v. Alza Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio
2010).
103 Belle Bonfils Mem'l Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118, 122-23 (Colo. 1983);
Bryant v.
Hoffinan-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Freeman v. Hoffman-La
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risks outweigh its benefits with regard only to a particular plaintiff or class
of patients;'4 that plaintiffs may establish a drug design defect by
introducing a reasonable alternative design that has not yet been approved
by the Food and Drug Administration;105 and that plaintiffs can establish
liability if an alternative FDA-approved drug is as effective as, and safer
than, the drug in question.106
The early cases relying on Comment k focused on manufacturers'
failures to warn about side effects that were not foreseeable at the time the
drugs in question were placed on the market. 0 7 In denying liability for
unforeseeable risks, the courts cited to Comment k's admonition that strict
liability should not be applied to drugs.108 With regard to drug design cases,
a number of courts held that all drug companies were immune from design
defect liability under Comment k, and for a time this was the received
wisdom. 109 However, in the last several decades, the notion that courts have
no role to play in reviewing drug designs has fallen into disrepute."r 0
Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb. 2000); Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 886
(Okla. 1994); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988).
1"See In re Fosamax Prods. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); infra text
accompanying notes 155-78.
105 Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 301, 306 (Idaho 1987).
06
See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-55 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying New
Hampshire law).
07
Chambers v. G.D. Searle, 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975) (no difference between
negligence and strict liability in a failure to warn case); Christofferson v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 92
Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (drug manufacturers liable only for failure to warn about
foreseeable side effects); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 399, 412-13 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967) (no strict liability for unforeseen results if drug was properly manufactured and
warnings are adequate).
' 08See Chambers, 441 F. Supp. at 381; Christofferson, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 827; Toole, 60 Cal.
Rptr. at 412.
10

9Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2003); Tatum v. Schering Corp.,
795 F.2d 925, 926 (1lth Cir. 1986); Hackett v. G.D. Searle & Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595
(W.D. Tex. 2002); Fellows v. USV Pharm. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D. Md. 1980); Stone v.
Smith, Kline & French Labs., 447 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. 1984); Brown v. Superior Court
(Abbott Labs.), 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (Cal. 1990); Edwards v. Basel Pharms., Div. of Ciba-Geigy
Corp., 933 P.2d 298, 300 (Okla. 1997); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 23-24 (Okla. 1982) (no
claim for defective design if warnings are adequate to physician); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813
P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991) ("we do not believe that a trial court ... is the proper forum to determine
whether . . . a particular prescription drug's benefits outweighed its risks").
0
"s See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., Div. of Searle Pharms., Inc., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir.
1989); Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1972); Kociemba v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1301 (D. Minn. 1988); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., Div. of Am.
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Today, although courts generally agree that they can review drug designs to
determine defect, they disagree as to the standard by which to establish
liability. II

1. Basing Liability on Failure to Adopt a Safer Alternative Drug
Midway in the search for an appropriate drug design liability standard,
several cases suggested that drug manufacturers, like other product
manufacturers, could be held liable for failing to adopt a reasonable
alternative design that would have avoided harm to the patient. 1 12 For good
reason the overwhelming majority of scholars agree that courts are
incapable of administering such a test, dependent as the test is on a judicial
determination that the FDA would have approved the proposed alternative
drug.113 Anyone proposing a change in the molecular structure of an
Home Prods. Corp., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1496-97 (D. Kan. 1987); West v. Searle & Co., 806
S.W.2d 608, 612 (Ark. 1991); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728, 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Toner,
732 P.2d at 308; Glassman v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 606 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Savina
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 923-29 (Kan. 1990); Bennett v. Madakasira, 821 So. 2d 794,
809 (Miss. 2002), abrogatedby Hutzel v. City of Jackson, 33 So. 3d 1116 (Miss. 2010); Pollard v.
Ashby, 793 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618
N.W.2d 827, 837 (Neb. 2000); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 420 A.2d 1305, 1318 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1980); White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 752-53 (Ohio 1988), supersededby
statute, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.75(D) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2015), as recognized in
Miller v. Alza Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Senn v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc.,
751 P.2d 215, 218 n.4 (Or. 1988); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781
(R.I. 1988).
"'See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-55 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying
New Hampshire law); In re Fosamax Prods. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Miller v. Alza Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2010); Toner, 793 P.2d at 301, 306;
Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 840; Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 382-83 (N.J. 1984).
112See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal. 1988) ("plaintiff might be able to
demonstrate at trial that a particular component of DES rendered it unsafe as a miscarriage
preventative and that removal of that component would not have affected the efficiency of the
drug"); see also Feldman, 479 A.2d at 383.
"'See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 8.10 (2005); William A. Dreier,
Manufacturers'Liabilityfor Drugs and Medical Devices Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 258, 262 (1999) ("It certainly does not aid the tort
system to turn each tort trial into a mini-FDA application procedure. A jury determination based
upon trial proofs should not be substituted for the FDA's extensive drug-approval process (or the
equivalent) for new and untried drugs."); Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative
Designs, and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207,
219-23 (1999); David S. Torborg, Comment, Design Defect Liability and Prescription Drugs:
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already-approved drug must present the proposed altered molecule to the
FDA for approval, thus initiating the selfsame review that is required for a
new drug.11 4 The new-drug approval process generally takes ten to fifteen
years, during which time the FDA reviews countless tests that check the
drug for safety and efficacy, utilizing thousands of patients." 5 The current
cost of bringing a new drug to market runs between 1.2-1.8 billion
dollars. "6
Because of the rigor of the process, only a small percentage of drugs
initially proposed to the FDA eventually receive final approval.'7 No court
Who's in Charge?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J., 633, 649 (1998) ("[C]ourts have often noted that the
chemical complexity involved in prescription drug design defect cases makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for a jury to competently make a determination as to the true benefits and risks posed
by the drug."); see also Henderson, Jr. & Twerski, supra note 4, at 151. But see Conk, supra note
71, at 1106-07; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription
Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L.

REV. 76, 99-103 (1994).
4

See, e.g., Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S.Ct. 2466, 2475 (2013) (If a drug manufacturer
were to change the composition of a drug, the altered chemical would be a new drug that would
require its own NDA to be marketed); see also Noah, supra note 29, at 863 ("even minor changes
in formulation ... would .. . require the submission of a new drug approval (NDA)").
1l

' For an extensive description of the FDA approval process see Henderson, Jr. & Twerski,
supra note 4, at 163-66. The approval process requires a drug manufacturer to submit an
investigational drug application (IND). On average, it takes eighteen months to get approval of an
IND application. See 1 O'REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 83, § 13:2, at 840-41. Once
approval of an IND is received, a drug undergoes three phases of human clinical trials to test for
both the safety and efficiency of the drug to attain a New Drug Application (NDA) approval.
During these various phases the drug is tested on thousands of patients. See Michael D. Green,
Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 461, 481, 487 (1997). For the most recent estimates as to the amount of time to develop a
drug and attain approval for marketing see JOSEPH A. DIMASi & HENRY G. GRABOWSKI, R&D
COSTS AND RETURNS TO NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE, OXFORD
HANDBOOK ECON. BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, at 21, 25 (Patricia M. Danzon & Sean
Nicholson eds., 2012) (11.8 years); PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF
AMERICA, 2013 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY PROFILE at 32 (2013) (10-15
years). An NDA typically consist of one hundred thousand pages or more. See Green, supra, at
487.
16
' See DIMASI & GRABOWSKI, supra note 115, at 23; PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND
MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, supra note 115, at 32.
1 The FDA has found that "a new compound entering Phase I testing, often representing the
culmination of upwards of a decade of preclinical screening and evaluation, is estimated to have
only an 8 percent chance of reaching market." See 1 O'REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 83,
§ 13:1, at 838-39 (citing Challenge and Opportunity on the Critical Path to New Medical
Products,
CHALLENGES
AND
OPPORTUNITIES
REPORT
(March
2004),
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could, even in a trial of much greater duration than normal, determine that a
supposedly safer alternative drug would have been approved by the FDA.
Of course, if another drug company has already marketed an FDA-approved
drug that has greater benefits and fewer risks than the drug in question,
liability may be imposed on the seller of the drug that harmed the
plaintiff.118 In that instance, a court would be comparing two FDAapproved drugs rather than seeking to establish that a drug that has not
undergone the FDA-approval process should be considered as an
alternative. In that circumstance, the court would not be required to
replicate the administrative approval process and the case would
presumably be adjudicable." 9 Why replicating the FDA process is highly
problematic will be explained in what follows.
Several published decisions utilize the safer-altemative-design test for
drugs. In Brochu v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorporation,'20 plaintiff, a 27
year old woman who suffered a stroke after taking Ortho-Novum-2mg a
birth control pill' 2 1 brought suit base on diversity of citizenship in federal
district court in New Hampshire. 122 The pill had a high estrogen content. 123
At the time that plaintiff ingested the pill, Ortho Pharmaceutical had on the
market birth control pills that had a much lower estrogen content and that
were equally effective as the Ortho-Novum 2mg. 124 Plaintiff alleged the
high estrogen content was the cause of her stroke and that the Ortho-Novum
2mg pill was defectively designed. 125 Plaintiffs experts testified that there
was no advantage to the pills with the higher estrogen content. 12 6 Defendant
argued that, regardless of the test for defect, New Hampshire law barred
drug design claims as a matter of law.1 2 7 On appeal from a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed,

http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathlnitiative/CriticalPathOpportuniti
esReports/ucm077262.htm).
" 8 See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981) (applying New
Hampshire law); Frazier v. Mylan Inc., 911 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1298 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
"9642 F.2d at 655 (applying New Hampshire law).
120
See generally Brochu, 642 F.2d 652 (applying New Hampshire law).
121Id. at 654.
122Id. at 653.
123Id. at 654.
1 24 Id. at 654 n.1.
1 251Id. at 654.
126Id. at 655 n.4.
127Id. at 655.
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holding that New Hampshire would recognize a cause of action for
defective drug design if plaintiff were able to establish the availability of an
alternative drug, already on the market, that was equally effective and posed
less risk. 12 8 In this limited context, where an FDA-approved drug was
available that was equally efficacious and presented less risk, the case for
defective drug design does not create the justiciability problems set forth in
earlier discussions.
Similarly, in Frazierv. Mylan Inc.,129 plaintiff brought a diversity action
in federal district court in Georgia against the manufacturer of phenytoin, an
anticonvulsant, claiming that the drug was defectively designed because it
caused a malady that eventually led to the patient's death.13 0 Plaintiff
alleged that several other well-known safer alternative drugs were available
to plaintiffs decedent that were equally effective, with a better safety
profile and with a lower risk of harm. 13 1 In denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment, the district court held that "allegations of substitute
products for phenytoin may be sufficient under a risk-utility analysis." 32
The only published decision holding that a drug manufacturer owes a
duty to develop and make available a safer drug is Toner v. Lederle
Laboratories.3 3 In that case plaintiff, a three-month-old child, received TriImmunol vaccine manufactured by Lederle Laboratories.1 34 The vaccine
was designed to immunize children against diphtheria, pertussis, and
tetanus. 135 Subsequent to the vaccination, the plaintiff developed a rare
condition of the spine, causing him to become permanently paralyzed.1 36
The heart of the design claim was that Lederle knew of the neuro toxicity of
Tri-Immunol, a whole-cell vaccine, but failed to develop a safer alternative
fractionated-cell vaccine and seek FDA certification of the safer
alternative.1 3 7 The case was tried in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction and the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff based on a

128id.

F. Supp. 2d 1285 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (applying Georgia law).
13 d. at 1287, 1297.
129911
0

13

Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1298.

32

1

Toner v. Lederle Labs., a Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d 297, 311 (Idaho
1987).
Id. at 299.

133

134

13sId.
136 d
13 7

Id. at 300.
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finding that Lederle was negligent.13 8 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit certified questions regarding the applicability of Comment
k to strict liability and negligence claims to the Idaho Supreme Court.13 ' In
a lengthy opinion, the Idaho high court held that Comment k did not bar a
negligence claim for design defect against a drug manufacturer.1 40 The
court acknowledged that as of the date of the trial the FDA had refused to
license any other fractionated-cell product and the sale of such a product
would, therefore, constitute a criminal offense under the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act. 141
The Idaho court's opinion is downright baffling. Even if the defendant
drug company owed a duty to develop a better vaccine, how could a jury
determine that the FDA would have approved such a vaccine had it been
developed? As noted earlier, obtaining FDA approval involves a complex,
multi-year process requiring testing of thousands of patients. 14 2 During this
process, the FDA typically engages in an ongoing, back-and-forth dialogue
with the applicant, leading to new paths of factual inquiry and the
development of additional evidentiary data. And sometimes the FDA
refuses to permit the applicant to continue, thereby terminating the
application process altogether.1 4 3 Imposing tort liability on a drug company
for its failure to develop a better vaccine assumes that the alternative
vaccine would have passed the rigorous FDA new drug approval process. A
trial court on remand in a case like Toner could only guess as to what might
have been the result had a fractionated-cell vaccine been put through the
New Drug Application regimen. Expert testimony at trial cannot suffice to
bridge this gap. The FDA frequently disagrees with, and refuses to approve
drugs advocated by, drug industry experts.1 44 A trial court could only
speculate as to whether a given expert opinion would have been given
credence by the FDA.1 45 Furthermore, experts at trial would not have the
data that the FDA would have required and might have helped to develop to
continue the new drug application process. For all of these reasons, Toner
must be reckoned a mistake. It is no wonder that there is so little support for
"asId. at 299.

' 39 Toner v. Lederle Labs., Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 779 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
14See Toner, 732 P.2d at 310-11.
141Id. at 301.
142See supra text accompanying notes 115-119.
143See 1O'REILLY & VAN TASSEL, supra note 83,
'"See id.
145See id.

§ 13:6, at 845-46, § 13:8, at 848-49.

§

13:2, at 841.
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the proposition that a drug manufacturer can be held liable for failing to
develop a reasonable alternative drug.

2. Condemning Drug Designs Based on Macro Risk-Utility
Balancing
A significant number of courts take the position that a drug can be
declared to be defectively designed if, from an overall perspective, its risks
outweigh its benefits. 46 Several considerations reveal why this sort of
macro risk-utility balancing is inadvisable. First, to undertake an analysis of
the overall social value of a drug for all uses would require highly complex
evidentiary inquiry. A court would have to look at all potential uses of the
drug for ailments that bear no relation to the case at bar. Potentially, many
illnesses would have to be considered, together with all the possible
benefits and detriments of the drug for each such illness. The trial would
closely resemble a roving inquiry into all the issues that a regulator might
have considered in deciding whether to allow the drug on the market.
Second, and perhaps more important, for a court to decide that a particular
drug's overall risks outweigh its overall benefits would mean that even if
the drug was highly valuable for one or more distinct classes of users, the
court might strike down the design as defective and thus by implication not
worthy of being prescribed even for those who would benefit from its
consumption. Of course, courts make such trade-offs all the time in
connection with nonprescription products by adopting an "aggregative
welfare" approach.' 47 But as explained earlier, the availability of

146See Miller v. Alza Corp., 759 F. Supp. 2d 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (denying motion for
summary judgment on drug design defect claim because plaintiff alleged that the risks of the drug
outweighed its benefits); In re Aredia & Zometa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:06-MD-1760, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72084, at *7, *9 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 13, 2009) (denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment because drug design defect cases require fact-based risk-utility analysis);
Wright v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 06-CV-4183-NKL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32121, at *8
(W.D. Mo. 2008) (issue of fact whether diet drug "which has occasional or fractious benefit
should enjoy insulation from strict liability in tort when the product's predominant effects are
detrimental to individual and public safety"); Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharm. Co., No. 5:05-527-JMH,
2006 WL 3533072, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2006) (defendant's motion for summary judgment
denied because plaintiff alleged that the cancer risk posed by the drug [Elidel] outweighed the
benefit of treating eczema); Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728, 730 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003) (claims for drug design defect are to be determined by "balancing the risks inherent in
a product design against the utility of the product so designed").
47
1 See supra text accompanying note 65.
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prescribing physicians as learned intermediaries support a nonaggregative,
"cake and eat it, too" solution.148
One might respond to the just-described difficulties by sheltering drug
manufacturers from macro risk-utility liability if the drug is found to
provide exceptional benefits.1 49 But such a threshold requirement would
deny the benefits of lifestyle drugs to those who value them. 150 To impose
design liability on such drugs because they can cause serious side effects
would effectively bar them from the market. Thus, a young man in his early
twenties who finds himself balding,'' or an eighteen-year-old who is
unable to date because his or her face is pockmarked with acne, 152 would be
denied a drug essential to their well-being as they define it because a court
decides that the drug does not present exceptional, life-or-death medical
benefits. Such denials strike the authors as overly paternalistic. Drugs rarely
have third-party effects, so the choice should be the patient's to make.1 5 3 If
the drug manufacturer adequately warns physicians about the risks
associated with lifestyle drugs, then the risk created by misprescription of
such drugs or devices should be dealt with by a malpractice action against

148 That is, the court can determine that the drug is nondefective in design (thus allowing those
who need the drug to have it-the "cake"), and at the same time allow the prescribing physicians
to protect from injury those who should not take the drug to avoid injury (thus allowing the system
to eat the cake free of a high rate injury). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 6(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
14 9
See cases cited supra note 101.
50
See Noah, supra note 29, at 861-68. The author has difficulty distinguishing which drugs
are therapeutic and which are lifestyle. Nonetheless, it seems safe to conclude anti-balding and
acne-reducing drugs are at one end of the spectrum and life-saving antibiotics are at the other end.
51
Rogaine is a drug that is used to help regrow hair on the scalp. Side effects include chest
pain, swelling of hands or feet, dizziness, confusion, and serious allergic reaction. Rogaine,
DRUGS.COM, http://www.drugs.com/rogaine.html (last visited September 7, 2015).
152Accutane, a drug that is effective in controlling serious acne, is linked to a series of side
effects including Crohn's disease, liver damage, miscarriage, and birth defects if taken during
pregnancy. Although Hoffman-LaRoche stopped marketing Accutane, the generic brands of
Accutane are still available. Accutane, DRUGWATCH.COM, http://www.drugwatch.com/accutane
(last visited January 23, 2015).
53
1 A small subset of drugs do have third-party effects. For example, a drug that causes
dizziness or seizures could cause injury to third parties if the drug affected the driver of a car and
caused a two-car accident.
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the physician who ignores those warnings rather than by a design case
against the manufacturer.1 54
3. Condemning Drug Designs Based on Micro Risk-Utility
Balancing
One way to avoid the just-described difficulties presented by macro
risk-utility balancing would be to determine only whether a drug is
reasonably safe for the particular class of patients of which plaintiff is a
member. Under this approach, instead of engaging in overall, macro riskutility balancing, the court would engage in what may be characterized as
micro risk-utility balancing. Although this approach might be appealing at
first glance, it would present serious conceptual difficulties. A finding of
product design defect, like a finding of negligence, sends a signal that the
designer/actor should have acted differently and more safely.15 Moreover,
given the likelihood that a manufacturer's stubborn refusal to respond to
that signal will support punitive damages in subsequent litigation,'5 6 one
may reasonably assume that a manufacturer will change its design.15 1
By contrast, if a court were to engage in micro risk-utility balancing and
find a drug design defective for only a smaller subset of patients, the court
would be signaling that the design should be changed for them. At the same
time, by also finding the drug design nondefective for all other patientsthose who derive net benefits-the court would be signaling that the design
should remain the same for that group.' 58 Obviously, the same drug design
cannot simultaneously be changed and remain the same. For the court to
signal otherwise, seemingly by fiat, would be self-contradictory and

154

A physician might be negligent in prescribing the drug to those for whom the drug is not
appropriate or for failing to inform the patient about side effects. The former would result in a
medical malpractice case. The latter would support an action for informed consent.
55

J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
See supra text accompanying note 97.
57
The company's course of conduct will, presumably, be dictated by the company's
assessment of which course benefits the company more. If only a handful of lower courts have
' See generally Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18
56

found a design defect, the drug generates significant profit, and punitives are unlikely to be
imposed, the company could be expected to continue to market the drug in question.
1 Technically, the signal would be that the drug may remain the same. But given the relevant
market incentives, and the fact that the court has tacitly concluded that the drug's benefits
outweigh its risks for a majority of patients, the court's signal will be more positive than more
indifferent.
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irrational. 15 9 If a court were nevertheless to employ such an approach, the
defendant drug company would either continue to market the drug,
presumably with strengthened warnings, 160 treating its exposure to liability
to patients in the subset as a no-fault "activity tax" of sorts, 16 1 or the
company would withdraw the drug from the market. 162 In the latter
instance, those patients for whom the drug is beneficial-perhaps a large
majority of users-would be deprived of its use.163
In light of these conceptual embarrassments, it is hardly surprising that
the authors have found only one published decision adopting a micro riskbenefit balancing approach. 164 In In re Fosamax Products Liability
Litigation,165 a seventy-two-year old woman developed a rare, debilitating
condition called osteonecrosis of the jaw (ONJ) after taking Fosamax, a
drug designed to treat and prevent osteoporosis.1 6 6 The plaintiff was thought
to have osteoporosis since her bone density was more than 2.0 standard
deviations below the mean for patients of her age. 167 When the plaintiffs
' 59 1n Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir. 1980), the court confronted the
very real possibility that different juries in separate cases might reach contradictory verdicts on the

same automobile design:
The result . .. is that while the jury found Chrysler liable for not producing a rigid
enough vehicular frame, a fact finder in another case [dealing with the same design]
might well hold the manufacturer liable for producing a frame that is too rigid .... In
effect, this permits individual juries . . . to impose on automobile manufacturers
conflicting requirements. It would be difficult for members of the industry to alter their
design and production behavior in response to jury verdicts in such cases.. . . Under
these circumstances, the law imposes on the industry the responsibility of [an insurer].
160Strengthened warnings would reduce the numbers of patients who take the drug when they
should not, and would increase the company's opportunity to raise proximate-cause and
comparative-fault arguments at trial. See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460,
466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); infra text accompanying note 178. And such warnings would show that the
company tried to avoid harm to plaintiffs, reducing exposure to punitive damages.
16 1
See Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 312-13 (Idaho 1987), in which the second-tolast sentence of the quoted opinion suggests that the court is imposing liability without fault.
162 Once again, it would be a function of the profits forgone vs. the liability costs avoided. See
id. at 312.
163 Presumably if the company has good information and acts in its own self-interest, this will
not occur when the aggregate benefits to such patients exceed the injury-related costs to the other
patients as reflected in the company's liability exposure to that subset of users.
1

"See In re Fosamax, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 471.

165

d.

1

"Id. at 465-66. This disease involves bone loss and increased risk of bone fracture.

1Id. at 467.
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physician prescribed Fosamax in 1997, her T-score was 2.1.6'8 Plaintiffs
expert testified that statistical studies evaluating the efficacy of Fosamax
showed that for the group of patients in the study with a T-score higher than
2.5 Fosamax had a thirty-six percent fracture reduction benefit versus the
placebo. 169 However, for the group of patients with a T-score less than 2.5,
the data did not show a statistically significant benefit for Fosamax use
compared to the placebo. 7 0
Plaintiff brought suit alleging both failure to warn and design defect."'
The trial court held that plaintiff could not establish proximate cause with
regard to the failure to warn claim, in that she did not introduce evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiffs treating
physician would not have prescribed Fosamax if he had been warned of the
risk of ONJ.17 2 The trial thus commenced solely on the issue of design
defect. 173 A jury returned a verdict of eight million dollars for the
plaintiff. 174 In sustaining the jury verdict based on risk-utility balancing, the
district court held that a jury could find that there was no "concrete
scientific evidence that Fosamax prevents fractures in patients with a Tscore better than-2.5."175 What is mystifying is how this finding
constitutes defective design. As noted earlier, the statistical studies
supported a finding that Fosamax was effective for patients with a T-score
2.5 and above. 176 It is not the design that was defective but rather the failure
to warn physicians that patients with a T-score of less than 2.5 should not
be given the drug because it presents significant risk and no benefit.1 7 7 The
18id.
1Id

at 468.

170

n fact, there were more fractures in the group receiving Fosamax than in the placebo
group. Id.
71
' Id. at 466.
172Id.
7

1 1Id.

at 467.

174

.

Id. at 469.
1"Id.
at 471 (applying Florida law, the court held that a "reasonable jury could conclude 'that
the risks of Fosamax outweigh its benefits when used for the prevention of osteoporosis by those
with a T-score better than - 2.5 . . .
6

17 Id. at 468.
177The

defendant argued for the application of Restatement, Third, of Torts: Prods. Liab.

§ 6(c). The court held that Florida had not adopted § 6(c) and thus would not adopt that test for
this litigation. It then said that even if it were to apply § 6(c) to Fosamax, the defendant would not
be entitled to judgment as a matter of law since plaintiffs expert testified that Fosamax had not
been shown to provide more than eighteen months of fracture reduction benefit across all patient
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drug was not defectively designed because it was an effective drug to treat
patients with a T-score of 2.5 and above.178
B. Condemning Drug Designs Based on the Restatement Test for
Design Defect: Free From the Shadow of Comment k
Several federal courts sitting in diversity have predicted that their
respective states would adopt § 6(c).' 79 An Arizona federal district court
dismissed a claim that Plavix, a blood thinner, was defective in design
because it presents a heightened bleeding risk for patients who are poor
metabolizers of the drug.180 Predicting that Arizona would adopt § 6(c), the
district court dismissed the design claim noting that the plaintiff did not
allege that no reasonable physician would prescribe Plavix for any class of
patients. 181
One federal court deciding a drug design case based on the New Jersey
Product Liability Act adopted a rule almost identical to § 6(c) of the
Restatement. 18 2 In Appleby v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc.,183 a plaintiff who
suffered severe side effects after taking Lotronex to treat irritable bowel
syndromel84 sued the manufacturer for failure to warn and defective
groups. Id. at 472. Even if defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it was
entitled to reversal based on an instruction that allowed recovery based on micro risk-utility
balancing. Furthermore, if § 6(c) were to be applied, the court could not conclude as matter of law
that Fosamax should not be prescribed for any class of patients. It would at worst be an issue for
the jury. Id.
78
By illegitimately characterizing the case as one of design rather than failure to warn, the
court allowed the plaintiff to escape the finding of no proximate cause as to a warning claim. Id. at
473-74.
179Mills v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. CV 11-986-PHX-FJM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116701, at *7 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2011); see also Gerbhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185
(D. Ariz. 1999) (predicting that Arizona would adopt § 6(c)); Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (predicting that Iowa would adopt § 6(c)). Several
courts have rejected § 6(c). See Fraser v. Wyeth, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 68, 83-84 (D. Conn. 2014);
In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 742 F. Supp. 2d 460, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying
Florida law); Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Mele
v. Howmedia, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 1026, 1038-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004); Freeman v. Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840 (Neb. 2000).
'soMills, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116701, at *12-13.
'Id. at *7-8.
182Appleby v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., No. Civ. 04-0062 RBK, 2005 WL 3440440, at *5
(D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2005).
83

id.

"

4

Id. at *1.
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design.' 85 The court granted the defendant summary judgment on the
warning claim because there was no proof that her physician would have
refrained from prescribing the drug had a more extensive warning been
given. 86 Turning to the design claim, the court said that under the New
Jersey statute, plaintiff must present evidence of a reasonable alternative
design to establish a prima facie case.187 Given that plaintiff had failed to do
so, the only other statutory ground for recovery based on defective design
requires that plaintiff prove that the "product is 'so dangerous and of such
little use that under the risk-utility analysis [the] manufacturer [should] bear
the cost of liability to others."" 8 8 Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that
would support that the drug was essentially worthless.' 89 Thus, in the
absence of a reasonable alternative design, the court applied a test that is the
functional equivalent of § 6(c).' 90
More recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Lance v. Wyeth,' 9
after engaging in a wide ranging discussion of drug design liability,
explicitly, albeit somewhat tentatively, adopted § 6(c) as the governing rule
of the case.1 9 2 Plaintiff s decedent, a thirty-five-year-old woman, had taken
Redux, a weight-reducing pill, from January through April of 1997.19' The
plaintiff alleged that Wyeth knew or should have known that Redux caused
pulmonary hypertension (PPH) and that as a result of ingesting the pill she
died of PPH in 2004.194 Plaintiff did not predicate her claim on failure to
warn, presumably because as early as 1996 the product packaging contained
a warning of an increased risk of PPH.' 9 5 Her claim was that
"'Id. at *4-6.
s'Id. at *6.

187 id.
88

1d. This test is set forth in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(b) (West 2014). Although the court
refers to the New Jersey Product Liability Act, it does not cite to the specific section of the statute
that is directly on point. Appleby, 2005 WL 3440440, at *6.
189 Appleby, 2005 WL 3440440, at *7.
190 See generally id.
'9 Lance v. Wyeth, 85 A.3d 434 (Pa. 2014).
192Id. at 459-60.
'9'Id. at 437.
94
' Id. at 460 n.40.
95
' See id. at 437. The court notes that the reason that the appellee (plaintiff) did not present a
warning claim was that no warning concerning Redux would be sufficient. Id at 459. Given the
fact that as early as 1996 Redux had a warning about the side-effect of PPH, the real reason that
plaintiff did not allege failure to warn was that Redux had a warning of PPH prior to the time that
plaintiff ingested the drug. See id.
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notwithstanding the warning, Redux was so dangerous that no physician
knowing the risk and benefits of the drug would have prescribed the drug
for any class of patients. 1 9 6
Defendant Wyeth argued that the only claims that can be made against a
drug manufacturer are that a drug was adulterated (manufacturing defect) or
that it failed to warn of the dangers associated with taking the drug.' 97 Drug
design claims cannot be made based on the theory that a reasonable
alternative design was available since any alternative design would result in
a "completely different compound with different properties and its own
unique benefits and risks ... ."' Wyeth further argued that Comment k
sheltered drug manufacturers not only from claims based on strict liability
but also from claims based on negligently marketing a drug that was so
unsafe that it should not have been prescribed for any class of patients."
The decision as to whether a drug has met the basic threshold of safety to
enter the market, Wyeth argued, should be delegated to the FDA.200 In
rejecting these arguments and adopting § 6(c), the court grounded the
plaintiff s design claim in negligence, but continued to shelter claims based
on strict liability from design liability. 2 0 1The court acknowledged that drug

design liability cannot be based on a claim that a pharmaceutical
manufacturer should have developed a reasonable alternative design, noting
that it is beyond judicial competence to replicate the FDA process for
approval of new drugs.202 However, the court saw no reason to shield drug
manufacturers from design liability when a pharmaceutical manufacturer
was negligent in marketing a drug that did not benefit any class of
patients.203
IV. CONCLUSION

Litigation against drug manufacturers has traditionally been based on
the failure to adequately warn about risks associated with taking the drug.

19M

at 447.

"'Id. at 441-42.
"'Id at 443.
'

99

Id. at 458.

200

Id at 444.

201

Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 458-59 (citing to Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 175).
203
Id. at 461. Although the Court adopted § 6(c) as the governing rule in this case, it noted
that whether a less restrictive test might be adopted in another setting was to be left to another day.
202
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By contrast, since the advent of § 402A, imposing strict liability for the sale
of defective products, courts have struggled with the question of whether
there ought to be a cause of action for defective drug design. Dean Prosser,
the reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the acknowledged
father of § 402A, addressed liability for defective drugs in Comment k to
§ 402A. 204 From the very start, the meaning of Comment k has eluded both
courts and scholars. Over the decades, courts have moved from a position
that Comment k absolutely bars actions for defective drug design to a broad
range of different tests that allow limited judicial review.205 We have
examined the various tests adopted by the courts and have found them to be
seriously flawed.
A claim that seeks to find a given drug design defective because the
manufacturer should have developed a safer alternative drug is
inappropriate because courts are incapable of sensibly deciding whether the
alternative proposed by the plaintiff would have met with FDA approval.
Since any drug marketed in the United States must be approved by the
FDA, a court must be able to determine that the FDA would have approved
the drug. Given the many-year duration of the FDA approval process,
which involves testing of thousands of patients, no court could rationally
determine that an alternative drug would have been approved. A claim that
a drug's risks outweigh its benefits, when considering all potential patients
or a given class of patients, fails because it does not regard as sufficiently
important the benefit of the drug to some patients. Imposing design-based
liability for sale or distribution of a drug may lead to its removal from the
market, thus denying that class of patients access to the drug. The
traditional rule relying exclusively on supplying warnings to learned
intermediaries who can direct a drug to the appropriate patients allows for
sensible discrimination among different classes of patients. A finding of
defective design does not allow for such discrimination. However, when a
court determines that a drug provides so little benefit and such great risk
that the drug should not be prescribed for any class of patients, then liability
should not follow. That is the test for defective drug design set forth in
§ 6(c) of the Products Liability Restatement. As explained in this Article,
the Restatement, Third, of Torts finds serious fault with the existing tests
for drug design defect that rely on Comment k for support. Comment k

2

0RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 1964).
See supra this article.
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provides no guidance to courts and litigants in this modem era of American
products liability. It is time to bid it an overdue farewell.

